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0.1. Resumen
El problema de las ontologías está a la orden del día en los diferentes campos
de aplicación de la Inteligencia Artificial (Programación Neuro-Linguística,
Recuperación de la Información, modelado de bases de datos, entre otros). En
todos ellos, las ontologías se están demostrando como una estrategia viable
mediante las cuales construir modelos robustos del dominio de investigación y
aplicación. Efectivamente, un conocimiento sustentado ontológicamente de los
objetos de un dominio ha necesariamente de facilitar su codificación, y hacerla
más transparente y natural. Ciertamente, una ontología puede proporcionar mayor
robustez a los modelos al construir los criterios y categorías con las cuales éstos se
organizan y edifican. Además, puede proporcionar los contextos en los cuales los
diferentes modelos pueden insertarse y recategorizarse para conseguir una trans-
parencia recíproca mayor. El reciente interés mostrado por los académicos de la
inteligencia artificial será analizado y se revisarán los principales proyectos en
curso. Por último, se presentará la diferencia entre la ontología como tecnología y
como análisis conceptual, esto es, la diferencia en el concepto que de las ontolo-
gías tienen los ingenieros del conocimiento y los filósofos.
Palabras clave: Ontología. Teoría. Organización del conocimiento. Bases
filosóficas.
0.2. Abstract
Ontology is the talk of the day in various chapters of AI (NLP, IR, DB mode-
ling among others). Ontology comes into play as a viable strategy with which, for
example, to construct robust domain models. An ontologically grounded know-
ledge of the objects of a domain should make their codification simpler, more
transparent and more natural. Indeed, ontology can give greater robustness to
models by furnishing criteria and categories with which to organize and construct
them; and it is also able to provide contexts in which different models can be
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embedded and recategorized to acquire greater reciprocal transparency. The
recent interest in ontology exhibited by AI scholars will be analyzed and the main
ongoing projects will be shortly discussed. The difference between ontology as
technology and ontology as conceptual analysis (that is, the difference between
ontology as understood by mainstream AI scholars and ontology as understood
by philosophers) will be presented as well.
Keywords: Ontology. Ontologies. Knowledge organization. Philosophycal
backgrounds. 
1. Introduction
In the past ten years, a considerable interest in ontology has developed.
Ontology is explicitly declared to be helpful in: general issues in knowledge repre-
sentation, knowledge acquisition, sharing, integration, and reuse, problem-solving
methods, object-oriented database design, natural language understanding and
machine translation, enterprise integration and engineering models, common-sen-
se reality, part-whole theories, matter, space, time and causality modelling, and
domain modelling —see Poli (2001) for extensive references. From this welter of
information we can conclude that there is a burgeoning KR research community,
which is opening up new avenues for research and undertaking important new pro-
jects. However, this interest may easily dwindle or end up in a blind alley unless at
least three problems are addressed very seriously: a) what is an ontology and
which are its boundaries (that is, what problems are ontological (rather than, say,
epistemological, logical or linguistic, etc.)?; b) what is the structure of an onto-
logy?; and c) who knows something about it? On considering these problems, one
notes immediately that the research community which has recently formed around
the label ‘ontology’ is somewhat reticent on such matters. On the other hand, wha-
tever conclusions we may reach, it is unreasonable to address a scientific (and
technological) problem without marking out its boundaries, without analysing its
structure, and without listening to those who know something about it.
Before dealing with the above questions, I must clear the field of a further
problem. The term ‘ontology’ is used with a wide variety of meanings, some of
which seem merely to attach a new label to areas of inquiry that are already well
delimited and consolidated. In these cases, by ‘ontology’ is meant no more than
'reference domain’ or ‘context’, without anything new being added to what
usually goes by the name of ‘semantics’. I shall not be dealing with semantic pro-
blems in this work and consequently shall not be considering ontology in this
sense. Let us now examine some other definitions of ontology.
Some definitions given in recent papers claim that ontology is: a collection of
general categories and associated relations, a formal description of the objects in
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the world, the content of logical pure forms, an explicit specification of a con-
ceptualization, a meta-layer theory (ontology as a viewpoint), a world model, or
a declarative model of the terms and relationships in a domain (for references,
cfr. Poli 2001).
Instead of discussing all the above definitions, I shall proceed by listing some
criteria —for a different discussion, see Guarino and Giaretta (1995). I shall
resort on two oppositions whereby ontology is either scientific research (1) orien-
ted towards objects or oriented towards our concepts (of objects), or (2) either
domain dependent or domain independent.
The opposition between orientation towards objects and orientation towards
concepts mirrors the difference between the two main senses in which ontology
is understood in philosophy (that is, the Aristotelian and Kantian viewpoints res-
pectively). In order to avoid confusions I would prefer to say that the two orien-
tations mirror the distinction between what may be properly called ontology and
what is usually called epistemology. Ontology proper is characterized by an orien-
tation towards objects. This amounts to saying that the main concern of ontology is
the world in its many facets. Ontology models objects by resorting to concepts. It
uses concepts. Analysis of the structure and of the formal and material components
of the concepts we use to shape the world is the concern of a different discipline,
not a problem for ontology. In fact, it is epistemology that covers the field of the
theory of concepts.
The second of the above two oppositions (that between domain dependent and
domain independent ontologies) determines the possibility of elaborating a gene-
ral ontology. By definition, general ontology can only be domain independent.
Otherwise it would simply be impossible to ask ourselves: “What ontological
categories would make up an adequate set for carving up the universe? How are
they related?” (Guha and Lenat, 1990, p. xvii). It is clear that if (general) ontology
provides a collection of general top-layer categories, an ontology is domain-inde-
pendent (Pirlein and Studer, 1995, 945). The opposite thesis, which claims that
ontology is always and only domain dependent, amounts to saying that general
ontology is a dream, something that cannot be the object of serious research.
The two oppositions taken together display a core general ontology. This core
ontology is therefore oriented towards objects, and it is domain-independent. As
an obvious corollary, the most spurious ontology will instead be oriented towards
concepts and will be domain dependent. In between there lie the two intermedia-
te cases.
On the other hand, it is also clear that definitions are not the last word on the
matter. We must look at the real work that effectively developed on their basis,
and for this more complex analysis more thorough development must be given to
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the idea of ontology. Our problem therefore is (i) to trace the boundaries of onto-
logy, (ii) to present its structure, and (iii) to find the scientific communities that
have the pertinent expertise. The definitions of interest to us here, can be summed
up as follows: ontology is the theory of objects. And it is so of every type of
object, concrete and abstract, existent and non-existent, real and ideal. Whatever
objects we are or might be dealing with, ontology is their theory (Meinong, 1960,
Husserl, 1970; Whitehead, 1925; Poli, 1996, 2001).
2. The boundaries of ontology
Ontological information should be distinguished both from epistemological
information and from quasi-ontological information.
2.1. Ontological vs. epistemological information
Defining the tasks and characteristics of ontology is important if we are to
avoid confusion with epistemology; confusion that is often apparent in the litera-
ture. The difference can be evidenced by listing concepts of ontology and episte-
mology. Ontological concepts are: object, process, particular, individual, whole,
part, event, property, quality, state, etc. Epistemological concepts are: belief,
knowledge, uncertain knowledge, revision of knowledge, wrong knowledge, etc.
If ontology is the theory of the structures of objects, epistemology is the theory of
the different kinds of knowledge and the ways in which it is used. The ontologi-
cal and epistemological perspectives interweave and condition each other in
complex ways. They are not easily separable, amongst other things because they
are procedures complementary to each other. The fact that there is a mutual or
bilateral form of dependence between ontology and epistemology does not obli-
ge us to conclude that we cannot represent their specific properties and characte-
ristics separately. On the contrary, we should specify both what ontology can say
about epistemology (a belief is a kind of object, it has parts and properties, etc.),
and what epistemology can say about ontology (knowledge of the structure of
objects is a kind of knowledge). This is a difficult task and mistakes are always
possible, but there is no principled reason for denying its realizability, even if one
understands why it is so easy to blur ontological and epistemological issues.
2.2 Quasi-ontological information
Ontology does not say everything that there is to say about every aspect of the
world. Besides the distinction between ontological and epistemological analysis,
a further distinction must be drawn between properly ontological information
and quasi-ontological information.
Ontology should be able to say that a certain object is situated somewhere, or
that an event has taken place at a certain moment. But it does not have to say the-
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se things using the Gregorian calendar or a particular system of coordinates. We
choose a system of measurement for every magnitude, but which system is cho-
sen is purely a matter of convention, and the relative module should be substitu-
table if for some reason it becomes necessary to use some other system of refe-
rence (with appropriate adjustments). The same applies to many other aspects of
design. Somewhere there will be a module in which the ontology is calibrated to
the measurement systems employed, and to such other purely pragmatic aspects
as the language of the user interface. Likewise, there must be a place in which
naturals, connectives, some functions, and so on, are imported. But which parti-
cular version is used is not an explicitly ontological problem.
A further quasi-ontological category consists of what I call ‘signature’. This
category furnishes information on who has made the categorization, where, when
and how. Such information is not always relevant, but there are some contexts in
which it is important: in medicine, for example, it is sometimes vital to know who
has made a diagnosis. Aspects of this kind perform a role internally to a fully
developed ontology, but they are not directly ontological components.
Before concluding this section, let me stress that, even if the range of ontolo-
gical analysis is extremely wide, we should not interpret ontology as the science
of everything from every point of view. There are many genuine problems that
are not ontological problems. We should find a way to distinguish ontology from
other scientific viewpoints. That is to say, ontology proper is not commonsense
analysis, or linguistic analysis or logical analysis. It is not the theory of concepts,
nor is it the theory of beliefs or of other mental attitudes. It is connected to all of
them, but it is nevertheless different from them.
3. The structure of Ontology
In this section I will try to give a feeling of the highly complex structure of
ontology —a much more extensive analysis is provided in Poli (2001). The first
step is to distinguish between the categories that enable us to analyse the structu-
re of objects.
3.1 Dependence Categories
The unity of the world is the outcome of the complex interweaving of depen-
dence connections and forms of independence among the many objects of which
it is composed. I shall seek to explain the features of this multiplicity by beginning
with an apparently trivial question: what is there in the world? Numerous answers
are available. For example, we may say that there are material things, plants and
animals, as well as the products of the talents and activities of animals and humans
in the world. This first prosaic list already indicates that the world comprises not
only things, animate or inanimate, but also activities and processes and the pro-
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ducts that derive from them. It is likewise difficult to deny that there are thoughts,
sensations and decisions, and the entire spectrum of mental activities. Just as one
is compelled to admit that there are laws and rules, languages, societies and cus-
toms. We can set about organizing this list of objects by saying that there are inde-
pendent objects that may be concrete (mountains, trees, flowers, animals, houses
and tables), or abstract (sets and other mathematical objects, propositions), and
dependent objects which in turn may be concrete (colours and sounds, kisses,
handshakes and falls) or abstract (formal properties and relations).
All these are in various respects objects of the world. Some of them are
actually exemplified in the world in which we live; others have been exemplified
in the past; and yet others will (hopefully) be exemplified in the future.
Consequently temporality is the truly distinctive (specific) feature of reality
(Brentano, 1995; Husserl, 1970; Hartmann, 1935), and we may state that reality
is everything that is located in time. Whatever the entities considered, they are
real if they are temporally characterized. This first finding already tells us that the
natural inclination to regard space and time as equally fundamental aspects of the
real world is, from an ontological point of view, inexact. Ontologically, space
characterizes only certain entities, namely material ones. But there are many
other entities that are not spatial: mental acts, for instance.
It is widely claimed that the mode of being of material things cannot be the
same as that of thoughts, actions, states of mind or intuitions. On this view, truth
and error are mixed because, as we have seen, to be real does not entail posses-
sion of materiality. Only things and living beings are spatial, while, as well as
these, the events of the mind and social events are temporal.
Having established this, forms of dependence and independence operate
among the various types of reality. In fact, the universal glue of any whatever
articulated ontology is provided by the network of dependencies among its
objects. We may distinguish at least three ontological strata of the real world: the
material, the psychological and the social (Hartmann, 1935; Husserl, 1989).
Specific forms of categorial and existential dependence exist among these strata.
For example: a psychological object or event requires an animate physical object
as its existential bearer. Should there be no person (and should there be no body
of some such person), then neither will there be the correlative psychological sta-
tes. Hypothesising forms of existential dependence does not entail resorting to
more or less overt hypotheses of reductionism. The various ontological strata
may be existentially constrained without this implying that they are categorially
constrained. The categories or properties which enable us to describe the world
of psychological states are different from the categories that enable us to descri-
be the world of animate and inanimate objects.
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A relationship of matter and form holds among many objects. In these cases,
matter and form are correlative categories, so that any form may be the matter of
a higher form, and any matter may be the form of a lower matter. The hierarchy
thus constituted is a progressive overforming of matter and form. The nature of
the physical world is clearly governed by this embedding principle: the atom is
the matter of the molecule, but it is already an entity endowed with form; the
molecule is the matter of the cell; the cell is the matter of the multi-cellular orga-
nism; and so on. In the matter/form relationship, matter is a constitutive part of
the object that results from it. The atom is part of the molecule, and the molecule
is part of the cell. If we possessed the equipment, we could dissect cells to reveal
molecules, and molecules to reveal atoms.
However, not all the dependences that structure the world are of a
matter/form type. When one moves from the organic to the mental plane, one
finds a dependence relation that is not reducible to the matter/form relation. One
cannot say, in fact, that atoms or cells or organisms are the matter of the mind.
Organic reality takes atoms and molecules and assembles them into a new form,
consciousness, which is nevertheless not made up of organic forms. In the passa-
ge from the material to the mental there arises a new series of forms whereby cor-
poreal life with its forms and processes no longer functions as matter. The orga-
nic layers are mirrored in psychic life: they influence it, they follow close upon it,
but they are not part of it (Hartmann, 1933). In effect, the life of the mind is not
an overforming of corporeal life. It does not comprise organic processes, nor
does it use them as its building blocks, even though it is supported by them and is
influenced by them. One finds another break between the mental stratum and the
social stratum. Mental acts do not constitute the objective contents of social rea-
lity, just as organic elements do not form part of the mind. In both the passage
from living to mental phenomena, and in the passage from mental to social ones,
the series of overformings is interrupted. In these cases the dependence rela-
tionship is no longer of matter/form type but becomes one of a completely diffe-
rent kind: a bearer/borne relationship. In this case, the substratum of the higher
layer is not the matter of the lower layer (Hartmann 1952, 68-69).
Analysis of the dependences among objects therefore requires us to distin-
guish at least two fundamental relationships: that among the layers and that among
the strata of reality (Poli, 1998, 2001, ch. 8). It may be thought that the distinction
between strata and layers is unnecessary. In general, and in the absence of precise
arguments claiming the opposite, I am on the Meinongian side: between two peo-
ple (or two traditions) one of whom (or which) makes a distinction and the other
does not, it is usually the case that the one who introduces the distinction has seen
something that the other has not (Meinong, 1921; see also Mulligan, 1986; and
Pol,i 1993/94). A terminological note may be of use here. For the sake of clarity,
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I shall say that overforming relationships hold among ontological layers, while
building-above relationships hold among ontological strata. Whereas by ‘overfor-
ming’ is meant that every category can constitute the ‘matter’ of a higher category,
the term ‘building-above’ denotes a very different type of conditioning. In this
case, the higher stratum requires the lower one only as its external basis of exis-
tential support, but not as matter to be supraformed. As we have seen, the ascen-
ding hierarchy of forms does not unfold without interruptions. It does not traverse
the entire real world in a continuous sweep. On the contrary, there are (at least)
two particular points at which the overforming process is interrupted.
Aristotle was right to stress the importance of the relationship between matter
and form. His theory is still today substantially acceptable, if one remains within
a particular ontological stratum. But it requires adjustment and development as
soon as one considers the various strata of reality. In this case the matter/form rela-
tionship is inadequate and should be replaced with the bearer/borne relationship.
The above description of the building-above relationship therefore enables us
to state that there exist at least three different strata of reality. Of these strata, that
of material reality (both inanimate and animate) acts as the bearer for the other two
strata. The material stratum bears the stratum of mental phenomena and social phe-
nomena. Belonging to the social stratum are all phenomena of communication, and
therefore the complex of social phenomena and customs, economic and legal reali-
ties, history, language, science, technology and the body of knowledge of every
epoch, and morals. That the social stratum differs from those of material and the
mind, and that its categories are not reducible to those of these strata, should be
obvious. Each stratum has its own principles, laws and categories. The nature of
one stratum cannot be understood using the categories of another.
The dependence relationship among strata tells us that there are never minds
without material bearers, and that there are never social phenomena without mate-
rial and mental bearers. In further specification of the difference between overfor-
ming and building-above, one notes that if the world were structured by a single
overforming relationship, the mind and the social would be made up of atoms, they
would possess weight, and so on. Or we would have to say that mental and the social
life ‘contain’ the organism (Hartmann 1933). The absurdity of these consequences
suffices to highlight the difference between overforming and building-above.
Specific overforming relations organize the various layers distinguishable
internally to each stratum. The forms assumed by this overforming are specific to
each stratum and cannot be ingenuously generalized. In the material stratum, the
overforming is mainly serial. The atom-molecule-cell example is sufficiently cle-
ar, but one should also remember the side-branches: man is an animal but not a
plant. The mental and social strata exhibit overforming mechanisms which are
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much more intricate than those that operate in the material stratum. In the case of
the social stratum, the various layers constitute a community of contexts with
numerous complex relations of dependence and reciprocal influence. On the
other hand, this segmentation into strata and layers gives rise to a different pat-
terning of complexity in objects. Higher strata and layers may be less complex
than lower strata and layers. Indeed, it is not always true that when one moves to
a higher layer, the complexity increases. Recent developments in systems theory
seemingly provide important confirmation of Hartmann’s theory of building-
above relationships. I cite by way of example the theory of autopoiesis and its
development in terms of social systems theory by Luhmann (1984).
Description of the strata and layers of reality intersects with description of the
objects of which it is composed. We humans participate in all three strata (alt-
hough we do not exhaust the multiplicity of any of them). We have a material
(organic) base, we have a mind, and we are simultaneously social beings. But our
material base is one of the many material bases offered by the natural world; just
as our mind is only one possible mind, and our participation in the social world is
never such that we can absorb it in all its aspects. For example, no individual pos-
sesses complete and absolute mastery of his or her mother tongue. The stratified
organization of reality should not be confused with the problem of the parts of a
whole, and whether all the parts of a whole are of the same nature as the whole.
Material objects may have non-material parts (for example, their centre of gra-
vity). But the strata of an object are not parts of the whole.
3.2. Top categories
The top categories employed by a well developed ontology derive from the
category ‘object’, and they themselves are objects. Each of them corresponds to
the traditional concept of ‘being’ or ‘entity’, but each of them forms a particular
context of analysis. As with the ancient analysis of transcendentals, it is always
possible to pass from context to another, but each context has its own specificity.
The analysis of strata and layers has shed light on some fundamental aspects
of the organization of reality, but it does not enable us to pass directly to objects.
The various strata of reality, in fact, do not coincide with the gradations of exis-
tent entities, although they intersect with them. They are not only strata of the real
world understood as a whole, but also strata of things themselves. Whatever
object we may wish to model, it is always something which exists somewhere in
time and which is made of some material or is the bearer of some material.
3.2.1. Object
I have already pointed out that I employ ‘object’ as a generic term. This is
proper, but it is not enough. In order to bring out the actual semantic value of
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‘object’ one must also assume that objects are always ‘complex objects’. In other
words, we must assume the ontological thesis that all objects are complex (the
anti-atomicity argument). As Hacking states, “Logic, depth grammar, structura-
lism, and the like should postulate points of convergence or condensation, not
atoms” (Hacking 1994, 30). To take up and generalize a remark by Bohm, we
should “give up altogether the notion that the world is constituted of basic objects
or ‘building blocks’. Rather, one has to view the world in terms of universal flux
of events and processes” (Bohm 1994, 9). Simple objects are idealizations relati-
ve only to the realm of abstract objects.
The assumption of anti-atomicity entails a number of important consequen-
ces. Firstly, every object, precisely because it is complex, is a whole with parts
(both as components and as functional parts). The complexity of the object also
determines the fact that the parts of the object interact with each other according
to various kinds of dependence internal to the object. This means that an object
has a structure and consequently structural stability. But this is not enough. If
objects are complex, it is natural to distinguish an interior from an exterior (envi-
ronment) and to posit the presence of a frontier (boundary) between them.
Secondly, an object, besides being a whole with parts, is also a substance with
determinations. These determinations tell us what the object is, in the various
ways that this can be stated (for example, both that ‘it is_white’ and ‘it is_an_ani-
mal’). Its substance consists of whatever underlies and unifies the various deter-
minations. A third aspect concerns the complexity of those objects which are
structured into several layers (material, biological, etc.). In this case, we must not
confuse the part-whole and substance-determination structurings with structu-
ring by strata and layers. Fourthly, the object “is something on which one can
have a perspective (Smith 1996, 117). This in turn entails that “the presence of an
object inherently involves its absence. The reason is simply the standard one: in
order for a subject to take an object as an object, there must be separation betwe-
en them – enough separation to make room for intrinsic acts of abstraction, of
detachment, of stabilization. So it is essentially an ontological theorem that no
object, for any given subject, will be wholly there, in the sense of being fully
effectively accessible. Or to put it more carefully: in order to be present, ontolo-
gically —i.e., in order to be actually present— an object must also be (at least
partially) absent, metaphysically, in the sense of being partly out of effective
reach (Smith, 1996, p. 232-233). I have used ‘actually’ for Smith’s ‘materially’.
Generally speaking, all represented objects are intrinsically incomplete
objects, and this is because every represented objected is intrinsically connected
to a specific perspective. The objectivity of the object is the aspect which stabili-
zes the situation by systematically coordinating possible perspectives with the
so-called perspective ‘from nowhere’ (Poli 2001, ch. 4).
26 Roberto Poli
Scire. 8 : 1  (en.-jun. 2002) 17-40.
3.2.2. Process
Whatever exists in space-time has temporal and spatial extension. Everything
said in the last section about the category ‘object’ must now be repeated about the
category ‘process’. From my point of view, the categories ‘object’ and ‘process’
are equivalent, so that the following phrase from Uexküll quoted by Lorenz
(1973) chimes perfectly with my position: “an object is that which moves toget-
her”. The only difference between object and process is that, in relation to the cate-
gorizing actor, the apparent constancy of objects stems from the fact that the
object changes much more slowly than the subject. As Hartmann (1933) points
out, what we call a ‘thing’ is only a stage of relative stability within a process. Like
objects, all real processes —i.e. all processes able to exert some influence— pos-
sess some degree of stability (Thom 1972). From what has just been said, howe-
ver, it is clear that ‘stable’ “does not mean static or atemporal!” (Smith 1996, p.
258). Everything that is dynamically real is partially stable, and consequently also
potentially unstable because stability is always stability relative to the interior of
the everchanging universal flux. Like all the other categories, also the category of
‘process’ imports its typical structures into ontology. In this case we have the
various stages typical of every process, which consist at minimum of the initial
stage of the beginning, the stage of ‘presence’, and the final stage of the end.
3.2.3. Substance
‘Substance’ is what remains identical in the continuous series of interrelated
changes constituting the process. Hence, “substance does not lie outside process
but is in it as that which perseveres” (Werkmeister, 1990, p. 106). Since the subs-
tance is what remains constant in the process, it is essential to understand that the
substance is functionally dependent on the process. Given a process that enjoys
some minimal condition of stability, we may assume that there is something
constant within it and we may seek to analyse and describe this something cons-
tant within the process.
3.2.4 Whole and Part
Classical physics is characterized by an in-built analysis of the world into
constituent parts (such as atoms or elementary particles). These are then recom-
posed together to provide, by means of synthesis, any system; interactions are
linearly and locally described; the resulting hierarchy of structures is grounded on
such constituent parts. On the other side, in contemporary science, the age of pure
analysis seems to have ended. It is well known that non-linear systems have pro-
perties that, in general, cannot be expressed in terms of decomposition into ulti-
mate, unstructured, pointlike parts plus a suitable sets of relations among them.
In general, what is it that characterizes wholes? Exemplification of whole as
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something connected may be acceptable for objects of the physical or biological
world. But what about social wholes (like ‘family’ or ‘community’) or institutio-
nal ones (like ‘university’ or ‘city’)? These too are wholes, they have their his-
tory, properties, parts, and so on, but they are not connected. Or they are not con-
nected in the same way as a material object.
We may make use of the concept of integrality to characterize wholes. But it is
evident that something can be a whole even if it is not (an) integral. For example, a
man whose hand has been amputated is still a whole, but he is not (an) integral. To
use a definition that dates back to Aristotle, an integral is something which has all
that parts that by nature it should have, although it is not easy to clarify what the
expression ‘by nature’ means. In any event, what emerges from the example that I
have deliberately chosen is that the expression ‘by nature’ does not necessarily
relate to something like ‘essential part’. Whatever definition of essential part one
(perhaps) accepts, it not obvious why a hand should be deemed an essential part of
a man, unless we resort to a universal version of so-called mereological essentia-
lism, which states that a whole is always essentially composed of its parts.
We must therefore follow a different route. A promising line of attack is
recognition that a whole comprises different types of parts and different types of
relation among parts. Put more precisely, the various parts of every type and their
reciprocal relations constitute structures, which contribute to some aspects of the
whole. At minimum we can ask ourselves:1) whether the part is separable from
the whole; 2) whether the parts are spatial or temporal; 3) whether the part plays
a specific functional role with respect to the whole; and 4) whether the parts are
homeomerous. Secondly, every whole has a boundary which separates it from its
environment. By virtue of possessing boundaries, a whole is something on the
basis of which there is an interior and an exterior. Put in different but not alterna-
tive terms, we may also say that a whole is something which displays some form
of independence with respect to an environment. Observing that, when analysed
at a sufficient layer of detail, every whole vanishes into a continuum, or accor-
ding to which every whole depends on something else, does not raise major dif-
ficulties. The fact that the boundaries of the whole are not absolute does not
imply, in fact, that these are purely apparent boundaries. Wholes and their boun-
daries are realities which effectively operate at the appropriate layer of granula-
rity. Thirdly, many wholes are themselves composed of other wholes. In dealing
with wholes composed of other wholes, the problem arises of calibrating the
‘weight’ of the more general whole with respect to the ‘weight’ of the boundaries
of its component wholes.
I now conduct more detailed discussion of the difference between separable
and non-separable parts.
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3.2.5. Separable and non-separable parts
However difficult it may be to specify the distinction between separable and
non-separable parts, a preliminary definition of the difference may be forthco-
ming from examination of the case of inanimate material objects. In this situa-
tion, we may call separable parts those which can be removed from the whole
without anything else taking their place. The exact meaning of ‘remove’ depends
on the type of object. An inanimate object behaves differently from an animate,
psychological or institutional object. If we take a physical object like a chair, a
part of it which can be removed is for example the back or the legs. The removal
of separable parts may have a destructive effect on the whole.
Non-separable parts are instead those which can be recognized and distin-
guished but which cannot be removed (Husserl, 1970, 3rd Investigation). There
are various kinds of non-separable part. At minimum we may distinguish: func-
tional parts (sub-systems), qualities, boundaries, and de facto non-separable
parts. The general non-separability of a system’s functional parts or functional
sub-systems depends on the fact that the nature of sub-systems is determined by
the nature of the whole. Consider the eventuality of separating the electrical or
braking system of a car, or the nervous system of an animal.
The non-separability of qualities is a non-separability of kind, not of instan-
ce. When some quality is ‘removed’ from the whole, a part of the same kind
usually takes the place of the part that has been removed. In effect, what is really
inseparable is not so much the individual part qua part as its genus. If I remove
the colour red from a table, it becomes of another colour or it assumes another
colour, but it is still in some way coloured. For categories like colour, weight,
shape, size, consistency, etc., material objects are structured in such a way that
they may display different instances of these categories in the course of their his-
tories, but they nevertheless always have them. A table may be of different sha-
pe, colour, weight, consistency, etc., but it will always have a certain specific sha-
pe, colour, weight, consistency, etc. Everything that we usually call a property or
quality or attribute belongs to this class. I then distinguish both types of part into
further sub-categories. For separable parts I distinguish between the case in
which all the parts are given simultaneously (and I obtain things, systems, aggre-
gates) and the case in which they are given in succession (and I obtain processes
and events). Boundaries, finally, are also non-separable parts. The last type of
non-separable part comprises de facto inseparable parts. The property of being
separable differs between things and events. Separable in the case of things is
whatever can be placed somewhere else, while in the case of events it is whate-
ver can be placed in another temporal moment. Despite this difference, the con-
cept is clear: separable is whatever can be placed elsewhere in space or time. In
fact, however, it often happens that also the spatial or temporal parts of a whole
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are not at all separable. If we consider the case of artifacts, their material parts can
be melted, glued, milled, welded, filed, sanded, drilled, bent, or at any rate sub-
jected to processes whereby they are no longer separable (Simons and Dements,
1996). Similar objections can be raised with reference to biological and social
particulars. Regarding biological particulars, it is asserted for example that not all
the separable parts in a body are in fact separable. A finger or a hand is separable,
but a head is not, because in this case what we have no longer have a body but a
corpse. The same applies to many social wholes. A quartet without one of its
members is no longer a quartet, at most it is a trio.
We must conclude from these examples that separability is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for being a part. It is said in these cases that everything
that is separable is assuredly part of an object, but not everything that is a part is
really separable. In other words, it is stated that, for the reasons just given, ‘sepa-
rable’ should not be taken to mean ‘effectively’ or ‘concretely’ separable, but
‘virtually’ or ‘ideally’ separable. A conclusion of this kind seems plausible but it
enormously complicates the problem. First of all, it should be noted that the dif-
ficulties that arose in the preceding analysis all connect with questions concer-
ning the identity of parts or wholes. If we run down the list of examples, we see
that the troublesome cases are of the type: once the parts have been detached
from the whole they are different from what they were when incorporated into
the whole (problem of the identity of parts, which applies for example to pieces),
if certain parts are removed from the whole, the latter becomes a different type of
whole (body-corpse, quartet-trio). But these are problems more closely connec-
ted with the identity of parts and wholes than with the part-whole relation.
Consequently, we must keep questions of identity separate from questions to do
with the ‘part-of’ relation. If we set problems of identity aside, it becomes natu-
ral to define ‘part’ as anything that can be separated from the whole, even if the
actual separation may have the effect of changing the qualitative nature of the
whole, or even of destroying it. With the appropriate variations, the difference
between separable and non-separable parts holds for every type of whole.
Parts are not wholes, but they can always be transformed into wholes. Let us
start from a whole, with its dependent parts, its boundaries, etc. In principle it is
always possible to take a part of that whole and analyse it as a whole. This means
that the element is analysed in and of itself, without being considering in terms of
its connections / functions / dependences vis-à-vis the whole with which we star-
ted. The various types of parts react differently to analysis. From an ontological
point of view, separable parts are potentially wholes. This means that we can
analyse parts without subjecting them to ontologically significant transforma-
tions. By contrast, non-separable parts only become wholes as the result of a rei-
fication process (i.e. a process which transforms them from dependent entities
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into independent ones). The same procedure of ‘reification’ or ‘autonomization’
applies to all forms of dependence.
4. Dependences, everywhere!
From an ontological point of view, the theory of dependence analyses the dee-
per-lying connections that enable us to say that the world is one world. I have alre-
ady said that there are various forms of dependence. In particular, I distinguished
among four forms of dependence: stratum- and layer dependence, substance-
determination dependence, part-whole dependence, and kind dependence.
Stratum-layer, substance-determination and whole-part dependences have alre-
ady been discussed; kind dependence will be discussed in the next section.
5. Kinds
We will say that anything with a certain structural unity is something of a cer-
tain kind. For an object to be an object of a certain kind its general determining
properties, those that make it a member of a kind, must be describable in terms of
appropriate generalizations. Let us assume that in the case of natural kinds, these
generalizations are the laws used by the sciences: which amounts to saying that
“if we are to produce an interesting account of natural kinds, we should insist that
members of natural kinds… must lend themselves to scientific explanation”
(Wilkerson, 1995, p. 31).
I begin with the distinction between natural kinds and dependent kinds. In
general, there is broad agreement that electron, proton, neutron, narcissus, chim-
panzee, stickleback, carbon, gold and water are natural kinds, whereas table,
nation, banknote, rubbish, cliff, perennial and bush are not. It is likewise gene-
rally agreed that, if there are natural kinds, they fall into at least two groups.
There are kinds of stuff, such as carbon, gold, water, cellulose, and there are
kinds of individual, such as tiger, chimpanzee, stickleback, narcissus. On the
other side, we may distinguish non-natural kinds into functional kinds, such as
table and banknote, and contextual kinds, such as cliff and bush.
I assume that appropriate generalizations with regard to functional kinds are
linked to the practices, disciplines and technologies employed to name, recogni-
ze, classify, use, produce and alter the objects that belong to them. This variega-
ted complex of cognitive and operational practices can be given the general label
of technologies. Obviously, there is no clear-cut distinction between sciences and
technologies: science is involved in numerous technologies, and technologies
use the most varied of sciences. AI in particular is a practice that raises numerous
important scientific problems and compels even very well-consolidated sciences
to reconsider their theories. As mentioned, I shall discuss functional kinds with
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reference to technologies. The argument that I wish to develop is that the relation
that connects natural and functional kinds is of the same nature as the relation
between sciences and technologies. The other case concerns those situations in
which the appropriate generalizations depend on the context concerned.
Obviously, in this case discussion will centre on contextual kinds.
I now examine these cases in some detail. First, it is advisable to dwell for a
moment on the difference between sciences and technologies. The key reason for
linking the natural kinds to the sciences is that the latter, however much they are
obviously interconnected, represent irreducibly different points of view. “An
excellent reason for taking biology seriously is that the biological properties of
things obviously depend directly on their physical and chemical properties. But
the explanatory apparatus of biology cannot in practice be reduced to the expla-
natory apparatus of physics or chemistry or both” (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 39). Any
science has its own ‘window’ on the world, selecting (through the pertinent pre-
dicates) only those objects that are at the ‘right’ layer of magnitude and energy.
On the other hand, the explanatory apparatus of technologies, “though no
doubt relative to a fairly high layer of size or complexity, is not emergent. It is, as
it were, perpetually provisional, and is constantly being reduced to, or connected
with, or supplanted by, the explanatory apparatus of some discipline characteris-
tically concerned with entities of some lower layer, notably physics, chemistry
and biology”. In other words, “geology and geography would be impossible if
there were no physics and chemistry of the various elements and compounds that
constitute our planet” (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 40).
Therefore, we will say that objects whose structural unity is described by
sciences are objects of a certain natural kind, whereas objects whose structural
unity is described by technologies are objects of a functional kind. In his theory
of natural kinds, Wilkerson defines them in terms of three conditions: (i) posses-
sing real essence, (ii) being subject to scientific investigation, and (iii) being
determined by an intrinsic property. For my part, I do not see how conditions (i)
and (iii) can be precisely specified, for which reason the reconstruction set out in
this chapter almost wholly uses condition (ii). For the time being, I resume
Wilkerson’s analysis of contextual kinds.
Contextual kinds can be well represented by the following examples:
“Gardeners talk cheerfully of seedlings, saplings, trees, shrubs, bushes, climbers,
perennials, annuals, pot plants, and so on, but none of these terms pick out a real
essence; none are likely to appear in reports of serious scientific investigation;
and none refer to a kind determined by an intrinsic property. One and the same
plant will grow as a tree under one set of conditions and as a shrub under others
(e.g. many Eucalyptus and Acer species). One and the same plant will be an
annual or pot plant in a temperate European climate and a shrub in a hot African
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climate (e.g. Pelargonium species). One and the same plant is a shrub in western
Ireland and a hardy perennial in Nottingham (e.g. Fuchsia magellanica). None of
those terms pick out an intrinsic property and none of them correspond, even
approximately, to any botanical classification”. “Yet none of the terms has any
connection with convention, artifice or culture” (Wilkerson, 1995,p.  37).
Wilkerson notes that the same point can be made about geographical and mete-
orological kinds: “Geographers talk of beaches, cliffs, mountains, valleys, seas and
volcanoes. Meteorologists talk of depressions, anti-cyclones, winds, thunders-
torms, clouds and hurricanes. But the terms do not pick out things with real essen-
ces, they do not figure in scientific generalisations and they do not pick out any rele-
vant intrinsic properties. One and the same lump of material will count as a
mountain in one environment, as a valley floor in another, and as part of the sea bed
in yet another. One and the same reaction counts as a thunderstorm if it happens on
a large scale in the open air, but if it happens under the bonnet of my car it is called
a short circuit and my car fails to start” (Wilkerson 1995, 37-8). In what follows I
shall assume the fundamental hypothesis that, for each of their ontological layers,
all objects belong to at least one natural kind and to one or more dependent kinds
(functional or contextual). For any layer, the natural kind of every object is con-
nected with the causal links of the object. In this sense, the scientific point of view
differs from the functional and contextual point of view in that the former seeks to
‘isolate’ the causal connections that determine the individual object independently
of its functional or contextual kinds. Let us consider ‘table’ or ‘rubbish heap’ and
try to understand why these objects as such are not natural kinds. Wilkerson
explains the matter limpidly: “If I know that the stuff in front of me is rubbish, or
that the object over there is a table, I am in no position to say what it is likely to do
next, nor what things of the same kind are likely to do… Obviously I can make safe
predictions about the behaviour of my table or rubbish heap under certain circums-
tances. I know the likely outcome of putting my kitchen table on the bonfire, or of
leaving a heap of vegetable waste undisturbed in a hot climate. But the point is that,
in making my predictions, I am exploiting the fact that every object, or quantity of
stuff, will belong to at least one natural kind, even if it also belongs to one or more
non-natural kinds … I am not predicting the behaviour of the table as a table, but
rather its behaviour as a quantity of cellulose … As Aristotle remarked: a bed and
a coat and anything else of that sort, qua receiving these designations … have no
impulse to change. But in so far as they happen to be composed of stone or of earth
or of a mixture of the two, they do have such an impulse, and just to that extent
(Physics II,1, 192b16-20)” (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 32-34). Put in general terms, natu-
ral kinds codify the causal network that govern the internal dynamics of objects.
The reference to internal dynamics may be nothing more than a modern ver-
sion of a thesis, which, as we saw in the quotation from Wilkerson, dates back to
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Aristotle. For Aristotle, in fact, plants and animals have a special ontological sta-
tus because they possess ‘nature’, whereas he connects the doctrine of natures
with a doctrine of independence. Plants and animals are natural kinds because
their existence does not depend on the existence of other objects. “What makes a
chimpanzee a chimpanzee, or a daffodil a daffodil… is its intrinsic nature, that is,
a feature that does not depend on the existence of something else”. “In contrast,
what makes something a table or a bed or a house depends crucially on its relations
to something else. For example, something is a bed if and only if it can act as a
comfortable nocturnal resting place for human beings” (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 25).
Hence the distinction between natural and dependent kinds is made to depend on
the distinction between intrinsic properties and relational properties. The problem
is only postponed, however, because it is unclear what criteria should be used to
delimit the intrinsic properties. Consequently, my decision to rely primarily on the
network of causal connections seems distinctly plausible. Above I drew the dis-
tinction between the functional and contextual families of dependent kinds.
Functional dependence states that certain things exist only in virtue of a rela-
tion to something else. Say, “something is a fuel pump because of a functional
relation to an internal combustion engine, and something is a pillar because of its
functional relation to a bridge or a roof. In other circumstances the fuel pump
might be a water pump, and the pillar might be hardcore for a new road”.
Functional dependence may also be conventional. As Wilkerson reminds us,
“sometimes an object is what it is because of a definite, though perhaps implicit,
convention. Certain lumps of metal or pieces of papers are coins or banknotes
because, according to a statute or statutory instrument, they can be used as a
means of exchange” (Wilkerson, 1995, p. 52).
However, the introduction of dependent kinds does not resolve matters enti-
rely. For example, “whether or not a plant is a tree or a shrub has nothing to do
with its relational dependence upon something else. If it has a single woody stem
and breaks into branches some feet above the ground, it is a tree, and if it is
woody and breaks into many stems very close to the ground, it is a shrub”
(Wilkerson, 1995, p. 54). To account for this situation we must introduce, besi-
des the natural kinds and the dependent kinds, also hybrid kinds: “The kind vege-
table is a hybrid of natural and dependent kinds. It is strictly not a natural kind,
for it includes plants of different species, even of different genera and families, in
a way that does not correpond even aproximately to any formal taxonomy. Other
examples of that sort of hybrid are fruit, pot plant, herb, pet…, cattle, medicine”
(Wilkerson, 1995, p. 57-8). Hybrid kinds may be highly specific: “Farmers and
greengrocers divide apples into the kinds dessert, cooker and cider, and butchers
distinguish the kinds ham, bacon and pork. The first distinction is at best a dis-
tinction between layers of acidity, and has little botanic significance… and the
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second distinction reflects the different ways in which pig carcasses are cured”
(Wilkerson, 1995, p. 58). Hybrids of functional and contextual kinds are: ski slo-
pe, surfing beach, gravel pit, oasis, biennial.
As the above examples show, a minimally adequate theory of kinds must be
able to distinguish not only among natural, functional and contextual kinds but
also among the various cases of hybrid ones. The theory of kinds presented in the
above section is synthesised in Table 1.
6. Overall architectonic
At minimum, an adequately developed ontology should be able to distinguish
among: a) general ontology (top layer categories and oppositions, plus their
dependence connections); b) domain ontology (analysing an ambit of reality,
which is usually given by a specific set of phenomena belonging to diverse onto-
logical strata), e.g. medicine, artifacts; and c) applied ontology (described in
terms of its use). Let us look at the general features of these ontologies, beginning
with general ontology.
General ontology concerns itself with (i) top categories, and (ii) their depen-
dence connections. Regarding categories, we are growing increasingly aware
that the top layer is a context which is extremely difficult to handle. For this rea-
son it is of maximum importance to employ an organization of the top categories
that is as transparent as possible.
As we have seen, there are general categories that apply to all the ontological
strata: for example, the category of ‘part’, which means that ‘part’ is a category of
the general ontology. However, the fact that this is a general category does not
entail that it is a univocal category. In effect, the concepts of ‘part’ that apply to
the material stratum differ substantially from the concepts of ‘part’ typical of the
mental or social strata. Note the deliberate use of the plural here: concepts of ‘part’
are not only different from stratum to stratum but they may also be different from
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Kinds
1.1. Stuff carbon, gold, water1. Natural
1.2. Individual tiger, stickleback
2.1. Functional table, banknote2. Dependent
2.2. Contextual cliff, bush
3.1. Between 1 and 2 vegetable, fruit, medicine3. Hybrid
3.2. Between 2.1 and 2.2 surfing beach, biennial
Table I. Theory of kinds.
layer to layer. We are therefore in need of both an extremely general characteriza-
tion of ‘part’ and of specifications of ‘part’ for each ontological layer. However
much the various top-layer categories may assume different values in the different
strata of the ontology, they must nevertheless have something in common.
Although ‘part-of’ differs as regards inanimate and animate objects, in both cases
we always speak of ‘parts’ and distinguish ‘parts’ from the other categories.
We know that each ontological layer is characterized by the presence of a
group of categories typical of that layer. The first task, therefore, is to find the most
general categories typical of that layer. There will then be groups of categories that
mark out particular sub-layers. The ontology of medicine, for example, is an area
in which certain of its components clearly belong to a sub-domain of the living
world, while others pertain to sub-domains of the psychological and social sphe-
res. I use the term ‘domain ontology’ to refer to the detailed structuring of a con-
text of analysis with respect to the sub-domains of which it is composed.
Two important points require making as regards the use of this approach. The
first is that one always talks of groups of categories. There are no real domains
characterized by one single top-category. In general, a domain is characterized
by complexes of categories which interact with each other. The second point is
that domain ontologies are not solely the outcome of the way a particular ontolo-
gical stratum is sliced up. Domain ontologies, in fact, are often the result of a
complex combination of local realms belonging to different ontological layers
and strata. Consider for example the case of artifacts. These are at minimum
objects of the inanimate material world. To characterize their ontology, however,
we must examine other dimensions as well, like the ‘design’, ‘manufacture’ and
‘marketing’ of artifacts, and these are dimensions of the social world. The onto-
logy of artifacts is therefore an ontology that operates crosswise to the sequence
of the ontological layers and strata. The same applies to the previous example of
the domain ‘medicine’. It is this ‘transversality’ that makes the categorization of
many domain ontologies such a complex undertaking.
By ‘applied ontology’, finally, is meant exactly what the name implies: the
concrete application of the ontological framework to a specific object (a particu-
lar hospital, for example) (Poli, 2001).
7. Standards
It is entirely obvious that ontology qua technology is still in its early stages.
At the moment, the research community seems to have reached broad agreement
only on the fixing of linguistic or formal standards. In this area, KIF and
Ontolingua are rapidly becoming accepted and well-established standards of
exchange and translation. This is certainly an important development, but it is
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one that can be called authentically ontological only by illegitimate extension of
the concept of ontology. Translation standards are not ontological components; if
anything they are quasi-ontological ones.
An example may be of help. We all know that in recent years important stan-
dards for software construction have become established. One thinks, for example,
of the Standard Template Library (STL) developed by A. Stepanov for the C++.
This is certainly a positive step forward, but it is one that involves formal compo-
nents, not ontological ones. We shall be able to talk of similar development in onto-
logical terms only when we have a Standard Template Library for ontological cate-
gories and constructs: to use, for example, in structuring analysis of the levels of
objects and their forms of dependence and independence, in analysis of categories
like process, thing, event and whole. At an intermediate layer, so to speak, between
ontological and cognitive analysis, it would be extremely useful to have templates
available for analysis of the categories used to recognize and classify reality, just as
it is essential to have sophisticated tools for the analysis, construction and organi-
zation of lexical fields. All this, however, still seems a long way off. And this is no
accident: we have a long way to go because, amongst other things, there is still no
general consensus even on the general features of an ontology and on the features
of whatever should accompany ontological analysis.
For this reason the most urgent task is to continue with the work of concep-
tual clarification of categories and of their organization. In effect, it is plain that
each of the topics addressed in the various sections of this paper calls for further
inquiry, and that several areas of ontology have yet to be explored. If we look at
the literature we soon realize the extent to which analyses have lacked systema-
ticity. For instance, whereas in the last fifteen years there has been an enormous
burgeoning of interest in the concept of PART, this is certainly not the case of the
correlated and ontologically more important concept of WHOLE.
8. Co-operations
From all what I have written, it is clear that ontology needs the contributions
of mathematicians, logicians, linguists, psychologists and philosophers.
Collaboration with philosophers is possibly the most difficult and even upsetting
one, because getting to grips with philosophy —in the area of both analytic phi-
losophy and of what is known as continental philosophy— is a difficult and even
frustrating business.
Philosophy in the English-speaking world is almost exclusively analytic. It is a
philosophical paradigm, by now in decline, whose legitimate effort to conduct rigo-
rous and methodologically correct inquiry has been reduced to impotence by two
assumptions. First, analytic philosophy shares with the mainstream of continental
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philosophy an epistemological error whereby ontological problems and inquiries
are converted into the problems and inquiries of the theory of knowledge. Second,
analytic philosophy differs from continental philosophy in its assumption that phi-
losophy is analysis of language. Matters are no better as regards continental philo-
sophy, which besides the epistemological fallacy mentioned above, suffers from at
least one further shortcoming: its general lack of methodological rigour.
Much of the decadence of contemporary philosophy is attributable to the fact
that the two most influential philosophers of the last fifty years —Wittgenstein
and Heidegger— rejected the alliance between science and philosophy. One can
only hope that contemporary philosophers will come to realize that they have
blundered into a blind alley and will revert to a more natural standpoint.
If philosophy is naturally allied with science, the philosophers to whom we
refer can only be philosophers who have acknowledged the alliance between phi-
losophy and science. I set out earlier the reasons why the most recent proposals
of both analytic philosophy and continental philosophy are unsuitable for our
purposes. We must accordingly take a step backwards and see whether immedia-
tely previous philosophy has something useful to offer. And, in fact, we find in
German-speaking philosophy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries
a group of thinkers who defend the two principles of alliance with science and the
autonomy of ontological problems. The latter principle states that ontological
problems cannot be reduced to those of the theory of knowledge. This position
was first set out by Franz Brentano, who declared that “the genuine method of
philosophy is none other than that of natural science” (Brentano 1968), and it was
developed in numerous directions by Brentano’s pupils: most notably by
Edmund Husserl and Alexius Meinong, or Roman Ingarden, who studied under
Husserl. Another German thinker who, although he studied neither under
Brentano nor under his pupils, nevertheless reflected their doctrines, and
Husserl’s especially, is Nicolai Hartmann, perhaps the most important ontologist
of this century. A philosopher in the English-speaking world to have argued
substantially similar positions —although one not directly influenced by the abo-
ve authors— has been Alfred North Whitehead.
9. Framing the ontological problem
It seems possible to say that in this essay I have elaborated what might be
called a possible framing of the ontological problem. I use the term ‘frame’ rat-
her than ‘analysis’ or even ‘solution’ because numerous problems obviously
remain due to the lack of both detailed analysis of the ontological categories and
of a method for the formal translation of the ontological categories and their
dependences. The principal of these still open problems, I believe, are the follo-
wing five: the development of a paradigm or of a template able to account for the
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stratified nature of reality, the functional nature of substance, the development of
an adequate concept of whole, the elaboration of criteria for the determination
and distinction of natural and derived kinds, and the elaboration of a theory of
ontologically transparent dynamics.
To use Husserl's way of speaking, these are problems pertaining to the 'mate-
rial' side of ontology and they are clearly intertwined with the 'formal' side of
ontology. The problem arises when —as is customary today— formal ontology
is forced to directly imitate formal logic. As far as I know, a detailed formal onto-
logy so explicitly linked to the outcomes of a well elaborated material ontology
has still to be produced.
10. Conclusion
Ontology needs the achievements of all the sciences if it is to accomplish its
aims. Even if we accept the Philosopher’s claim that, by virtue of the problems it
addresses, ontology is philosophia prima (first philosophy), because of the ans-
wers it proposes ontology can be only philosophia ultima (last philosophy). In
between there is science.
Broadly speaking, the variously articulated research communities of philo-
sophers, linguists, psychologists and engineers have still not found a way to rela-
te to each other systematically. However, in dynamic terms, one easily foresees
mounting social and institutional pressure for tools able to model fragments of
reality in terms that are both adequate and efficient. And from this point of view,
we are all at fault. Those colleagues who concern themselves with artificial inte-
lligence seemingly pay closer attention to manipulation and technique than to
knowledge. Likewise, those who concern themselves with general issues suffer
from the reverse problem, that of navigating in a sea of theories for which the
rationale is sometimes unclear. For my part, I grow increasingly convinced that
the same problems will force the former to address theories, and the latter to
address the limitations of our current capabilities. Provided, that is, that both
sides have the will, the ability, the desire and the courage to do so. If they decide
to tackle these problems, it becomes reasonable to identify and systematically
develop those areas of convergence and contact now existing.
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